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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT C. LARSON,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant

:

Case No. 920711-CA

vs.

:

Oral Argument
Priority 15

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., a
Pennsylvania corporation;
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CHEMICALS
COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation; et al.,

:
:

Defendants-Appellees.

:

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal as of right from a final judgment in a civil
case in a District Court.

Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah

Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1992).

As

authorized by § 78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court transferred the case
to the Court of Appeals by order entered October 23, 1992.

(R.

553) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1«

Does the statute of limitations commence to run in a

products liability case prior to the time that the plaintiff
discovers both the fact of injury and the causal relationship
between the injury and the product?

This presents a question of

law and is reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial
court.
2.

Klinaer v. Rightly. 791 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1990).
Did the presence of disputed factual issues preclude

summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue, where the
evidence would support a finding that plaintiff filed his action
within four years of discovering the causal connection between his
injuries and defendant's product?

The propriety

of summary

judgment is a legal issue which is reviewed for correctness with no
deference to the trial court.

Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97,

102 (Utah 1992).
3.

May

a trial

court

resolve

disputed

factual

issues

regarding a statute of limitations issue adversely to the plaintiff
following a bench evidentiary hearing, even though plaintiff had
requested and was entitled to a jury trial?

The issue of whether

the trial court had authority to make factual findings on a jury
issue is a question of law which should be reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Appellant is not aware of any constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is
determinative of the issues on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case. This

liability action.

2

is

a

civil

products

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Plaintiff filed his Complaint and Jury Demand on August
29, 1988.

Each of the defendant's answered and asserted, among

other defenses, that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (1992).
(Retep Answer, R. 26-29; Thatcher Answer, R. 36-46; PPG and Diamond
Shamrock Answer, R. 53-58; Wasatch Answer, R. 59-65.)
Chemical also cross-claimed

Wasatch

against all other defendants for

indemnification or contribution.

(R. 59-65)

Defendant, Thatcher Chemical Company, moved for a summary
judgment on April 18, 1990, arguing that plaintiff had failed to
show that Thatcher supplied any of the product which injured
plaintiff.

(R. 261-63)

Defendants, PPG Industries, Inc., and

Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Company, filed their motion for summary
judgment on May 25, 1990, asserting that plaintiff's claims were
barred by the statute of limitations.

(R. 300-02)

On July 26,

1990, defendant, Wasatch Chemical Company, joined in the summary
judgment motions of Thatcher and of PPG Industries and Diamond
Shamrock.
An initial hearing on the summary judgment motions was held
July 30, 1990. All defendants joined in the motions of the other
defendants. The court held the motions in abeyance for 90 days to
allow further discovery.

(R. 405) Wasatch Chemical filed its own

motion for summary judgment on August 7, 1990, following the
hearing.

(R. 416-17)
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On November 15, 1990, plaintiff stipulated that his claims
against Thatcher Chemical Company be dismissed with prejudice based
on the lack of evidence to support the claims against Thatcher.
(R. 508-09)

Plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of claims

against Wasatch Chemical Company on January 15, 1991.

(R. 521-23)

The order dismissing Wasatch Chemical provides that the parties are
to bear their own costs and attorney's fees, thereby implicitly
resolving Wasatch Chemical's cross-claim.
The second hearing on PPG and Diamond Shamrock's motion for
summary judgment occurred January 7, 1991.

The trial court took

the matter under advisement, but also requested that the parties
schedule a hearing to present testimony.

(R. 520) The evidentiary

hearing requested by the trial court was held June 3, 1991.
528)

(R.

Following the hearing, on December 5, 1991, the trial court

issued its memorandum decision determining that plaintiff's claims
were barred by the statute of limitations.
Judgment was entered January 17, 1992.

A formal Order and

(R. 534-39)

timely filed his notice of appeal on February 14, 1992.

Plaintiff
(R. 540-

42)
C.

Statement of Facts.

As is appropriate in a summary

judgment proceeding, the

following facts are stated in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
In May, 1964, at the age of 19, plaintiff started work for

Black & Decker as a tool repairman.
4

(R. 837) His duties included

disassembling tools, cleaning the parts in a solvent, and repairing, reassembling and testing the tool.
was

vaporized

trichloroethylene

(R. 838) The solvent used

(TCE).

(R.

838,

846-849)

Trichloroethylene is now recognized as toxic solvent which can have
adverse

effects

perceptions, and

including

headaches,

liver damage.

drowsiness,

See Richard

J.

distorted

Lewis, Sr.,

Hazardous Chemicals Desk Reference 1137-38 (2d ed. 1991).
Over the next five years, until he was promoted to manager in
1969, plaintiff used the TCE in a vapor degreaser on an average of
15 to 20 times per day.

(R. 853) Even as manager, plaintiff would

still occasionally perform repairs and use the vapor degreaser,
although not as frequently as before.

(R. 859)

Even when not

working with the solvent, the vapor could be smelled anywhere in
the building, although plaintiff soon got used to the smell and
didn't notice it.

(R. 829, 981)

Plaintiff's exposure to the TCE

continued until 1971 or 1972, when Black & Decker switched to a
different type of solvent.

(R. 843, 951-53)

In August, 1964, three months after starting with Black &
Decker, plaintiff married his wife, Marilyn, whom he had been
dating for over a year.

(R. 903-04, 1464)

About the same time,

Marilyn started noticing periodic changes in Robert's personality.
(R. 1465-66)

Marilyn at first assumed it was due to the pressure

of a new job, being engaged, and repairing a home for the couple to
move into.

(R. 1465) Some time later, Robert starting complaining

of headaches.

(R. 1467)

Robert's mother thought that the now

5

frequent headaches and other illnesses in her previously health
son, could be blamed on the lack of adequate care from Marilyn.
(R. 1467)
The TCE has caused a myriad of problems for Robert Larson,
including headaches, a general lack of energy, lethargy, irritability, memory loss, a higher than normal incidence of misplacing
things, mood changes, confusion, bleeding sinuses, inability to
handle stress, personality changes, depression, hyper-sensitivity
to smells, and decreased sex drive.1

(R. 1000-1003)

The Larsons

consulted the family doctor concerning the headaches and the bloody
sinuses (R. 1006, 570), and consulted with marriage counselors
concerning the emotional and behavioral problems.

(R. 564, 891)

On some occasions, Robert's behavior became violent.

For

example, he threatened to kill his wife and children on more than
one occasion.

(R. 1471.)

He would harshly verbally abuse his

children when he was angry, such that his children were scared to
death of him.

(R. 1475-76.)

Mr. Larson, however, would have no

memory afterwards of these incidents.

(R. 1012, 1471-72) Marilyn

k)n remand, plaintiff will also present evidence that he
discovered, after filing the notice of appeal in this case, that he
now suffers from liver disorders which a physician has opined was
caused by the exposure to solvents including trichloroethylene.
Alternatively, in the event this Court affirms the dismissal of
plaintiff's claim, plaintiff reserves the option to file a new
action to seek recovery for the newly discovered injuries,
consistent with the rationale of Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co. , 534
F.2d 566, 574 (3d Cir. 1976); Martinez-Ferrer v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 165 Cal. Rptr. 591, 594-97
(1980); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 684 F.2d 111 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), and similar cases.
6

sought relief from Robert's behavior by going to a marriage
counselor, which did temporarily relieve the problem.

(R. 1469)

In addition to the marriage counselors, both Robert and
Marilyn Larson consulted with their family doctor concerning
Robert's headaches.

The medication prescribed by the doctor made

Robert very ill and he did not seek further assistance from the
doctor.

(R. 566)

Neither Robert nor Marilyn associated the headaches, personality changes, or other symptoms with his exposure to TCE at work.
In fact, the headaches and abusive behavior were more pronounced on
weekends when he was away from work.

(R. 1470)

Gradually, the

abusive behavior decreased, and Marilyn assumed that her husband
was finally mellowing as a result of the marital counseling.

She

did not realize at the time that the improvement occurred at
approximately the same time that Black & Decker stopped using TCE
solvent.

(R. 1473)

The TCE purchased by Black & Decker came in 55 gallon barrels
with no distinctive markings or warnings, except that one barrel
warned against inhaling the vapors through a cigarette.

(R. 855)

There were no warning instructions on the vapor degreaser.
852)

(R.

No written or oral warnings concerning the use of TCE were

given to Robert Larson or other employees.

(R. 992) The only time

plaintiff or other employees used any protective clothing or
breathing devices was when cleaning the vapor degreaser, when a
respirator mask was worn.

(R. 857)

7

In the Fall of

1984, the Larsons watched

documentary about various chemicals, including TCE.

a television
(R. 567-68)

The program described the side effects of the chemicals, which
closely matched the symptoms Robert Larson had experienced starting
with his exposure to the TCE.

(R. 1461)

Larsons thereafter

contacted additional physicians, and finally found some that could
help alleviate the problems.

(R. 568) They commenced this action

to recover for their injuries, less than four years later in
August, 1988.

(R. 2-9)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A cause of action does not arise until both an injury occurs
and the injured persons becomes aware of how the injury was caused.
Courts in other states have applied such a discovery rule to
chemical injury cases.

Good policy reasons support applying a

discovery rule in this case.
The question of when a plaintiff discovers who or what causes
his injuries is an issue of fact.

The facts in this case would

support a jury finding that plaintiff reasonably did not discover
the cause of his injuries until viewing a television program about
trichloroethylene.

His symptoms were worse when away from work

where the chemical exposure occurred. Plaintiff was not personally
aware of the behavioral changes the chemical caused, and had he
been aware would likely have attributed the changes to the stress
of a new marriage and new job.

Plaintiff consulted a physician

8

about his injuries and had no compelling reason to shop around for
another physician.
The trial court erred in holding a hearing and resolving
factual matters against plaintiff. Plaintiff had requested a jury
trial, and was entitled to have the jury determine the factual
issues related to the statute of limitations.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT ACCRUE UNTIL PLAINTIFF BOTH
SUFFERED AN INJURY AND DISCOVERED THE CAUSE OF THE INJURY.
The trial court held that plaintiff's claims are barred by the
statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann, § 78-12-25(3) (1992),
which provides that ,f[a]n action for relief not otherwise provided
for by law" shall be commenced "within four years." The defendants
had the burden of proof on this issue.

"[T]he statute of limita-

tions is an affirmative defense in which burden is upon the
defendants to prove that the action was not commenced within [the
statutory period] after the plaintiff discovered the wrongdoing."
Stewart v. K&S Co.. Inc.. 591 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979).

In

addition, because the ruling was made on a motion for summary
judgment,

it

is

reviewed

by

this

Court

for

correctness.

Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992).

Summary

judgment can be granted only if the depositions and other materials
in the record, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, fail to
raise an issue of fact. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving. Inc. .
9

773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).

Any doubts should be resolved in

favor of allowing the case to proceed to trial.

King v. Searle

Pharmaceuticals, Inc.. 832 P.2d 858, 865 (Utah 1992).
Two events must occur before a cause of action arises and
starts the running of the statute of limitations.
injury is the first event.

Suffering an

Second, the injured person must become

aware of the causal relationship between the injury and the
prospective defendant.

Foil v. Ballincrer, 601 P.2d 144, 147-48

(Utah 1979); Deschamos v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 473 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) .2 Stated differently, "a cause of action does not accrue and
the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff
learns of or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
learned of the facts which give rise to the cause of action."

2

Although both Foil and Deschamps were concerned with a claim
for medical malpractice, their logic applies with equal force to
plaintiff's claim in the instant action. Justice Stewart stated
the basis for the rule:
While the recipient may be aware of a disability or
dysfunction, there may be, to the untutored understanding
of the average layman, no apparent connection between the
treatment provided by a physician and the injury suffered. Even if there is, it may be passed off as an
unavoidable side effect or a side effect that will pass
with time. Indeed, common experience teaches that one
often suffers pain and other physical difficulties
without knowing or suspecting the true cause, and may, as
often happens, ascribe a totally erroneous cause to the
manifestations. Even those who are trained in medical
science often require the additional expertise of one
possessing specialty training to diagnose properly the
cause of certain ailments.
Foil, 601 P.2d at 147.
10

Klinaer v. Kiahtlv, 791 P.2d

868, 869

(Utah 1990)

(footnote

omitted).
These exceptions to the general statutes of limitation are
sometimes described as a "discovery rule." The Utah Supreme Court
first described the discovery rule in Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d
84 (Utah 1981).

The Court noted three situations where discovery

rules apply:
The three circumstances set out in Myers
whereby this Court will apply the discovery
rule are where (1) the legislature has adopted
the discovery rule by statute; (2) there is
proof of concealment or misleading by the
defendant; and (3) application of the general
statute of limitation rule would be irrational
or unjust.
Klinaer. 791 P.2d at 872.
The exceptions to statutes of limitation are in part of
product of the modern age.
developed

"The simple fact is that rules

against the relatively unsophisticated

backdrops of

barroom brawls, intersection collisions and slips and falls lose
some of their relevance in these days of miracle drugs with their
wondrous, unintended, unanticipated and frequently long-delayed
side effects."

Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105

Cal. App. 3d 316, 324, 165 Cal. Rptr. 591, 595 (1980)
Myers applied a balancing test to determine whether the
discovery rule should apply in a particular case.

There are good

policy reasons for applying such a rule to this case.

Although

plaintiff certainly knew that he had been using trichloroethylene,
and knew that he was suffering physical ailments not previously
11

experienced, there was no obvious link between the two.

The

symptoms did not appear the first day he was exposed, but appeared
gradually over a period of years.

Plaintiff and his wife reason-

ably could and did attribute many of the symptoms as being marital
problems occasioned by the stress of a new job and marriage.
Defendants, on the other hand, were much more likely to have been
in a position to know and to have warned of the hazardous effects
of exposure to trichloroethylene.

While some evidence may be

difficult to locate because of the passage of time, that disadvantage will weigh more heavily on plaintiff, who has the burden of
proof.
Courts similarly faced with delayed discovery of the connection between chemical exposure and injuries have held the claim
does not arise until the plaintiff discovers both the injury and
the causal link.

In Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731 (10th

Cir. 1980) , the plaintiff worked as a meat wrapper from 1950
through 1972.

The meat was wrapped with a clear plastic film

coated with polyvinyl chloride (PVC), which gave off toxic fumes
when cut by a heated wire.

Her symptoms appeared a few months

before she quit her work. Several doctors were unable to diagnosis
the cause of her problems.

The plaintiff suspected a link to the

fumes, but "testified that she had no information of a definite
link between the polyvinyl chloride fumes and her disease until she
began

to get

bulletins

from her Union

in July, August

and

September, 1975." 637 F.2d at 736. A November 5, 1973, article in

12

the Journal of the American Medical Association posited that the
fumes might be causing a problem and solicited input from others to
determine if there was a relationship.

The evidence showed that

neither lay nor medical persons would have associated the symptoms
with the cause. The court applied the discovery rule and held the
claim was not barred by the statute of limitations.
Similarly, in Pereira v. Dow Chemical Co. , Inc. , 129 Cal. App.
3d 865, 181 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Ct. App. 1982), the court held that the
discovery rule is an exception to the rule that the cause of action
accrues when the wrongful act takes place, which applies "when the
pathological effect occurs without perceptible trauma and the
victim is blamelessly ignorant of the cause of the injury; in that
case, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
person knows or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should
have discovered the cause of injury."

181 Cal. Rptr at 369

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

The plaintiff in that

case noticed a rash a few weeks after a chemical spilled on him,
but the rash went away after a few weeks.

Sometime later the

plaintiff noticed swelling in his legs. He asked one doctor about
the swelling while visiting the doctor for an unrelated ailment,
and later visited the doctor solely about the swelling.

Several

doctors noted a probable correlation between the chemical exposure
and the plaintiff's subsequent liver ailments, but the doctors did
not communicate their concerns to the plaintiff.

The court held

the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations.

13

Other courts have generally held that a discovery rule may
apply in a products liability cause of action.

E.g., Comment,

Statute of Limitations—Discovery Rule—When Cause of Injury in
Products Liability Action is Arcane, Discovery Rule Bars Running of
Statute

of

Limitations

Until

Plaintiff's

Suspicion

of

Cause

Receives Some Reasonable Medical Support, Graves v. Church & Dwight
Co.. Inc., 115 N.J. 256, 558 A.2d 463 (1989), 21 Rutgers Law J. 669
(1990); Annot., Statute of Limitations:

Running of Statute of

Limitations on Products Liability Claim Against Manufacturer as
Affected bv Plaintiff's

Lack of Knowledge of Defect Allegedly

Causing Personal Injury or Disease, 91 A.L.R.3d 991 § 4 (Supp.
1991).
The determination of whether a discovery rule applies is a
question of law.

Klinger v. Rightlv, 791 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah

1990). This Court should hold that plaintiff's claim did not arise
until plaintiff discovered both his injury and the causal connection between the injury and the exposure to trichloroethylene.
POINT II
DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE
OF WHEN PLAINTIFF DISCOVERED THE CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN HIS INJURIES
AND HIS EXPOSURE TO TRICHLOROETHYLENE.
Summary judgment can be granted only if the depositions and
other materials in the record, and the reasonable inferences
therefrom, fail to raise an issue of fact.

Ron Case Roofing and

Asphalt Paving, Inc., 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Any doubts
should be resolved in favor of allowing the case to proceed to
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trial.

King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 865

(Utah 1992).

The trial court held:

[P]laintiff's delay of fourteen to twenty-four
years before making any effort to learn the
cause of his symptoms was not justified, and
reasonable minds cannot differ with regard to
whether plaintiff should have made an attempt
to determine whether his symptoms were caused
by exposure to trichlorolethylene [sic] prior
to viewing the unidentified television program
sometime in 1984.
R. 536.
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the facts in this case,
viewed as required in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
establish that plaintiff made an effort to determine the cause of
his symptoms, sought treatment for what he believed was the cause
of the symptoms, and reasonably should not have known of the cause
of his injuries until viewing the television program in the fall of
1984.

The presence of a justiciable issue is illustrated by

comparing the instant facts with the facts in following cases.
In several cases involving chemical exposure, the courts have
upheld the bar of the statute of limitations because the evidence
showed that the plaintiff strongly suspected, soon after exposure
to a toxic chemical, that his or her injuries were caused by the
chemical, but failed to understand the full severity of the
injuries.

In contrast, there is no evidence that the instant

plaintiff had any inkling that his discomforts were caused by
trichloroethylene. The leading case of this nature is Albertson v.
T.J.

Stevenson

& Co., Inc. , 749

15

F.2d

223

(5th Cir.

1984).

Albertson was a seaman on board an ocean-going vessel from November
1968 to February 1969, and as part of his duties was required to
clean electrical parts with TCE.

He had used TCE on prior

occasions, but never full strength. He testified he "knew TCE was
a dangerous chemical requiring special precautions and that a label
on some of the TCE canisters warned against prolonged use of the
chemical as creating a potential for liver damage."
226.

749 F.2d at

On the voyage he lost consciousness and experienced severe

headaches on five or six occasions, and after the last and most
severe episode told his superiors that he would not apply TCE
again.

From 1969 to 1972 he experienced blackouts, nausea, and

hallucinations, and he began hearing voices.

In late 1972 he

attempted suicide to avoid the voices.
In 1980 a doctor informed Albertson that there was probably a
causal connection between the TCE and his symptoms.
filed suit July 17, 1981.

Albertson

The court described two types of

injuries for purposes of statutes of limitation:
It is generally accepted that a cause of
action for a tort accrues when there has been
an invasion of the plaintiff's legally protected interest.
Ordinarily, this invasion
occurs at the time the tortious act is committed. If some injury is discernible when the
tortious act occurs, the time of event rule
respecting statutes of limitations applies,
and the plaintiff's cause of action is deemed
to have accrued.
If the plaintiff later
discovers that his injuries are more serious
than originally thought, his cause of action
nevertheless accrues on the earlier date, the
date he realized that he had sustained harm
from the tortious act.
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In some cases, however, the injured
person may not realize that a tort has been
committed upon his person, since he may sustain a latent injury which either is not or
cannot be discovered until long after the
tortious act that caused the injury has occurred and after the applicable statute of
limitations otherwise would have run. In such
a case, courts have routinely applied the socalled discovery rule to toll the running of
the statute of limitations.
When the discovery rule applies, the plaintiff's cause of
action does not accrue on the date the tortious act occurred, but on the date the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have
discovered, both the injury and its cause.
749 F.2d 228-29 (citations omitted).
The court discussed several latent injury cases where courts
had allowed actions many years after the initial injury, and
concluded:
In each of the pure latent injury cases set
out above, the plaintiffs were victims of
postponed awareness of their injury, the cause
of their injury, or both their injury and its
cause. Logic and sound jurisprudence mandate
the conclusion that a plaintiff's cause of
action does not accrue under these circumstances until the injury and the cause are
knowable.
749 F.2d at 231.
The Albertson court held that Albertson's case was a traumatic
event/latent manifestation case, because he both knew of the injury
and its cause at the time of the first exposure.

The court

accordingly affirmed the summary judgment dismissing his case.
Another case where the plaintiff suspected a chemical causal
link is Clav v. Union Carbide Corp. , 8a8 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1987).
From 1969 to mid-1976, the plaintiff worked on the Mississippi
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River as a pilot aboard pushboats that carried toxic chemicals. He
filed suit September 6, 1985, alleging he inhaled the fumes causing
"laryngitis, difficulty breathing, nausea, burning eyes, headaches,
bronchitis, memory loss, mental confusion, dizziness, prostate
gland

trouble,

erratic

heartbeats,

sinus

congestion,

and

a

productive cough." He complained to the captain that the chemicals
were making him sick, and told a doctor that he thought his
symptoms were caused by the chemical exposure.

His symptoms

improved and he felt better when he was not working on the boats.
He changed jobs in 1977 to avoid further chemical exposure.

In

1985 a doctor diagnosed his problems as being caused in part by
chemical exposure.

The plaintiff claimed he didn't possess the

critical facts necessary to start the statute of limitations
running until visiting the doctor.
Relying on Albert son v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223
(5th Cir. 1984), the Clay court affirmed summary judgment dismissing the case, largely because the plaintiff suspected at the time
that his discomfort was caused by the chemicals.
open the possibility that the statute would

The court left
not run

plaintiff wasn't aware of the relation:
Clay argues strongly that when a worker suffers minor physical annoyances, such as headaches, transient dizziness, or congestion that
he causally connects to his work environment,
such knowledge should not be considered an
invasion of a legal interest sufficient to
start the statute of limitations running
against him thereby precluding suit when he is
later found to be suffering from a serious
occupational illness.
Clay's argument has
18

if the

merit and is not foreclosed by Albertson.
In
fact, the AiJbertson court specifically stated:
"This is not a case in which, coinciding with
the trauma, an injured seaman experienced and
noticed only a minor injury and at a later
time discovered an unexpected latent injury
that was unknown and unknowable at the time of
the traumatic event." 749 F.2d at 233. Thus,
a worker's knowledge of physical annoyances
caused by his work environment that are precursors of a more serious occupational disease
does not necessarily constitute possession of
or reasonable opportunity to discover the
critical facts and cause of his injury, which
is necessary to start the statute of limitations.
828 F.2d at 1107 (underlining added).
Two examples of cases where the plaintiff did not have a
strong suspicion, or was not able to get medical corroboration of
a suspicion, are Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.
1980); and Pereira v. Dow Chemical Co. , Inc. . 129 Cal. App. 3d 865,
181 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Ct. App. 1982), both of which are discussed in
Point I of this brief.
One case where a plaintiff apparently had no suspicion of the
cause of her injuries is Mann v. A.H. Robins Co., 741 F.2d 79 (5th
Cir. 1984), which involved an intrauterine device.
the device was
miscarried.

implanted,

Shortly

the plaintiff

thereafter

the

A year after

became pregnant and

device

was

removed

plaintiff began experiencing pain in her lower abdomen.
months later she had a hysterectomy due to endometriosis.

but

Sixteen
Eleven

years after first being fitted with the device and 8 years after
the last injury, she discovered a link between her injuries and the
device and filed suit.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district
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court's grant of summary judgment, holding her claim did not accrue
until the plaintiff both knew she had been injured and knew or
reasonably should have known the cause of her injury.
Another instructive case is Hando v. PPG Industries, 771 P.2d
956 (Mont. 1989).

In April 1982, Hando had the duty of painting

various surfaces in the coal mine where she worked.
manufactured by PPG Industries.

The paint was

Hando suffered adverse physical

reactions to the paint at the time she used it, and believe at that
time that certain physical and emotional problems she suffered were
related to the chemical exposure. Hando visited several physicians
concerning her problem, but was unable to get a physician to agree
with her belief until 1984.

She filed her complaint in October

1985, more than three years after the exposure and onset of her
ailments. PPG moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations
grounds, the trial judge denied the motion, and PPG appealed.
The Montana Supreme Court held that a statute of limitations
is tolled "until a plaintiff discovers the injury, or until he
should have discovered the injury with the use of due diligence, if
the injury is self-concealing."

771 P. 2d at 961-62.

stated:

The facts in the present case indicate
that although Hando was very much aware of
those continuing physical, emotional and
mental ailments she suffered after her exposure to the paint, she did not know the
cause of those injuries until May of 1984.
Prior to that time, she and SCCC suspected
that her ongoing ailments stemmed from her
20

The court

exposure to the paint manufactured by PPG.
She even filed a workers' compensation claim
in May of 1982 based upon this belief. However , the veracity of her belief was not known
until May of 1984. . . .

. . . [W]e likewise hold that the three-year
statute of limitations did not begin to run
until a medical opinion was rendered in AprilMay of 1984 linking her injuries to her exposure to the PPG paint.
771 P.2d at 962.
Like the plaintiff in Pereira, the injury to Robert Larson
occurred "without perceptible trauma."

181 Cal. Rptr at 369.

In

contrast to the plaintiff in Clay. Larson7s symptoms were worse on
weekends when he was away from the toxic fumes. Unlike Albertson,
who knew that TCE was dangerous, Larson testified he "always just
thought of it as just a harmless type solvent and never thought
about anything like that."

(R. 993.)

Although defendants have questioned wonder why Mr. Larson did
not make a more diligent effort to obtain a medical diagnosis of
his problem, a jury would not be required to find a lack of
diligence on the facts of this case. Larson did seek medical help
for the headaches, and received a medication that made him more
sick.

He inquired about the bleeding sinuses, but received no

assistance.

Although some people may, with hindsight, say he

should have consulted other physicians, it cannot be said that no
reasonable person would have failed to take further action. Among
the most serious of Mr. Larson's injuries was the personality
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changes and resulting abuse towards his wife and family, yet Mr.
Larson was not aware of the problems at the time.

It cannot be

said that no reasonable person would have failed to take more
action.
judgment.

The trial court erred in deciding this issue by summary
The decision should be reversed and remanded for trial

before a jury.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO HAVE A JURY DETERMINE ANY DISPUTED FACTS
RELATING TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
This case was decided by summary judgment, which by definition
should be based only on "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories,

and

admissions

on

file,

together

with

the

affidavits, if any." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Taking oral testimony
is inconsistent with the rule that the court on summary judgment
may not weigh the evidence, determine credibility issues, nor make
findings.

See, e.g., Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc.,

740 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987); Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291,
1292 (Utah 1978) ; Hill ex rel. Fogel v. Grand Central, Inc., 25
Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150, 151 (1970).
Plaintiff had demanded a trial by jury.

(R. 9.)

Plaintiff

argued in his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Defendant PPG's and Diamond Shamrock's Motion for Summary Judgment
that the issue of when plaintiff discovered all facts related to
his injury was for the jury, not the trial court.

(R. 365-66.)

The trial court nonetheless requested and held a hearing on the
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statute of limitations issue.

The holding of such a hearing was

not improper, but could not have been used to resolve factual
issues against plaintiff.

The purpose of such a hearing was

explained in State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1989):
[A] trial court has the discretion to consider
evidence concerning running of a statute of
limitations in pre-trial proceedings. If the
evidence is sufficiently clear, the issue may
be resolved as a matter of law at that juncture , avoiding, perhaps, further proceedings.
If, however, it cannot be said that as a
matter of law the statutory period has run,
the issue is a question of fact for the trier
of fact.
782 P.2d at 196 (citations and quotation marked omitted). Accord,
Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co. , 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976)
(any issues of fact concerning a statute of limitations defense
must be submitted to jury).
The evidence in this case was not clear and capable of
supporting only a conclusion in favor of the defendants. See Point
II above.

To the extent the trial court used the evidentiary

hearing to resolve any factual questions, the procedure was
improper and prejudicial.

The order of the trial court should be

reversed and the case remanded for a jury determination of the
statute of limitations issue.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in deciding disputed factual issues on
a summary judgment motion.

The facts support a finding that

plaintiff reasonably did not discover until fall 1984 that his
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various symptoms were all related to exposure to trichloroethylene
which had occurred many years before.

The summary judgment of

dismissal should be reversed and the case remanded for trial.
DATED this 7th day of May, 1993.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: /
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSE
Attorneys for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD J U D I C f t a t ^ I O T E J C T
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT C.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

LARSON,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO.

C-88-5604

vs.
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., a
Pennsylvania Corporation,
et al.,
Defendants.

An evidentiary hearing was held on June 3, 1991 pursuant to
Motions filed by the defendants Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co.
and PPG Industries.
Smith.

Defendants PPG and Diamond Shamrock were represented by

Jay E. Jensen.
Alma

G.

Plaintiff was represented by Stanley R.

Defendant Retep Corporation was represented by

Peterson.

The

causes

of

action

against

Thatcher

Chemical Co. and Wasatch Chemical Co. were heretofore dismissed
with prejudice.
The

Court

heard

the

testimony

of

witnesses,

Memoranda filed and took the matter under advisement.

read

the

For some

unknown reason the file was returned to the clerk's office
without the Motion for Summary Judgment being ruled upon and
counsel advised accordingly.

The Court now enters its ruling.

LARSON V. PPG INDUSTRIES

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The plaintiff claims that during the years 1964 through
1974 he was exposed to the chemical trichloroethylene ("TCE")
while being in the employment of Black and Decker as a tool
repairman,
TCE was used to clean power tools.
TCE, had

available

purifying

Employees, when using

for their protection

respirators

and

ready

rubber gloves, air

access

to

a

washroom.

Plaintiff did not use the respirator at all times or wash his
hands regularly when working with the TCE.
Within

a

few months

after being

employed

by Black and

Decker, plaintiff began to experience physical and emotional
symptoms,

such

dizziness,

as

mood

headaches,

changes,

bleeding

irritability,

from
lack

the
of

sinuses,

sex

drive,

memory loss, and he became abusive with his wife and family.
Even

though

one

or

more

of

these

symptoms

manifested

themselves, plaintiff did not seek medical attention.
Plaintiff contends that while watching a television program
in 1984 he was alerted to the potential harmful effects of
TCE.

However, it was not until some four years later that he

filed this action.
The

issue

plaintiff's

presented

cause

of

to

action

the

Court

is

whether

is

barred

by

the

or

statute

not
of

limitations.
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LARSON V. PPG INDUSTRIES

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until plaintiff saw the television program in
1984, about TCE which made him aware of his claim for injuries.
The Court agrees that in some instances the statute does
not begin to run until discovery of the cause of the injury is
made by the claimant.
The credible evidence leads the Court to find that the
symptoms manifested themselves shortly after the exposure to
TCE, but plaintiff did not pursue medical attention or attempt
to learn what was causing his physical and emotional problems.
This was not a case wherein the disease or ailment laid
dormant

or

was

latent

before

manifesting

therefore, plaintiff would have no reason

its

symptoms;

for not pursuing

medical attention or filing a suit at an earlier time.
Plaintiff has been unable to ascertain the date he and his
wife saw the television program in which the effects of TCE
were discussed.

In addition, the health care providers have

not been able to definitely state that any of the plaintiff's
symptoms are the result of his exposure to TCE.
The

Court

concludes

that

these

defendants' Motion

Summary Judgment should be granted.
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for

LARSON V. PPG INDUSTRIES

The

Court

refers

PAGE FOUR

the

parties

MEMORANDUM DECISION

to

these

defendants7

Memorandum and Reply Memorandum for additional reasons why the
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
Dated this

°

day of December, 1991.

JOHN A. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

LARSON V, PPG INDUSTRIES

PAGE FIVE

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT C. LARSON,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
PPG INDUSTRIES, I N C , a
Pennsylvania corporation;
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CHEMICALS
COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation; THATCHER CHEMICAL
COMPANY, a Utah corporation;
WASATCH CHEMICAL COMPANY, a
Utah corporation; and RETEP
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C88-05604
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants.

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendants PPG
Industries, Inc., and Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Company, on or
about May 25, 1990, came on for hearing before the Honorable John
A. Rokich on July 30, 1990.

The plaintiff was represented by

Stanley R. Smith and defendants PPG and Diamond Shamrock were
represented by Phillip S. Ferguson. Retep was present through its
President, Alma G. Peterson, although it was not represented by
counsel. Retep joined in the Motion in open Court. The Motion was
held in abeyance for 90 days pending further discovery by the
plaintiff.

It came on for hearing a second time on January 7,
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1991. Before ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court
elected to conduct an evidentiary hearing which occurred on June 3,
1991. Retep was neither present nor represented at the evidentiary
hearing.

The Court, having studied the memoranda filed by the

parties, having considered the testimony offered by plaintiff and
defendants on the issue of the statute of limitations, and being
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters the following
Order and Judgment:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The statute of limitations applicable to this case is

§ 78-12-25(3), the general four year statute of limitations.
2.

The statute of limitations ordinarily begins to run when

the last event giving rise to the cause of action occurs which, in
this case, was no later than December 31, 1974.
3.

The recognized exceptions to the general rule regarding

the commencement of the statue of limitations, collectively known
as the discovery rule, do not apply in this case because (a) there
is no provision for the application of the discovery rule within
the statute itself; (b) it is undisputed that plaintiff was aware
of all of the symptoms of which he now complains by 1974, most of
them within months of his first exposure to TCE in 1964 and 1965;
(c) although plaintiff sought occasional medical attention for his
various symptoms, it is undisputed that plaintiff made no effort to
learn the cause of his symptoms until several weeks after viewing
an unidentified television program in 1984; (d) there is no
evidence that defendants concealed or misled or attempted to
2

conceal or mislead or otherwise prevent plaintiff from learning any
information about triclorolethylene and the potential side effects,
if any, caused by exposure to triclorolethylene in the work place
environment; (e) there are no exceptional circumstances which
prevented plaintiff from seeking treatment and filing suit many
years earlier than he did.
4.

To the extent the discovery rule may be applicable to

this case, plaintiff's delay of fourteen to twenty-four years
before making any effort to learn the cause of his symptoms was not
justified, and reasonable minds cannot differ with regard to
whether plaintiff should have made an attempt to determine whether
his symptoms were caused by exposure to triclorolethylene prior to
viewing the unidentified television program sometime in 1984.
5.

Plaintiff's long delay in attempting to connect his

symptoms with his exposure to triclorolethylene has made it
virtually impossible for the parties to discover credible evidence
regarding

who

supplied

the

triclorolethylene

to

plaintiff's

employer, whether all applicable instructions and warnings were
transmitted by the distributors to the employer, whether the
plaintiff was exposed to other chemicals, toxic substances, or
circumstances which could account for his symptoms, and whether the
symptoms from which plaintiff suffers were caused by exposure to
triclorolethylene, all of which constitutes serious prejudice to
the defendants should plaintiff be allowed to pursue his claim.
6.

For all other reasons set forth in the Memorandum in

Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment and their Reply
3
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Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Court hereby grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Judgment is entered herewith in favor of the defendants and against
the plaintiff, no cause of action.

Defendants are awarded their

costs incurred herein.
DATED this

/ *7 day of

^ 2-Ylutr^

199^

BY THE COURT:

John;A. Rokich
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Stanley R. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff
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